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 1 
MISSING PIECES IN THE PATCHWORK OF EU FINANCIAL STABILITY 
REGIME? THE CASE OF CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 
 
HEIKKI MARJOSOLA 
PhD Candidate, University of Helsinki 
 
Abstract 
This article builds on a recent case (Case T-496/11, UK v. ECB (Location policy)), in which 
the General Court determined that the ECB does not have competence to regulate so-called 
Central Counterparties (CCPs), and annulled an ECB policy which sought to restrict access 
to the euro area of certain non-euro area CCPs. It is argued that the Court’s central finding, 
though possibly correct, is problematic from the perspective of financial stability, especially 
considering the growing systemic importance of CCPs. Second, the Court’s finding is 
symptomatic of certain drawbacks inherent in the patchy architecture of the evolving EU 
financial stability regime, which is excessively focused on banks. Finally, the case acts as a 
warning of likely future situations where the exercise of EU level competences and forms of 
direct administration related to the objective of financial stability can result in an outright 
conflict with basic free movement rights. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The financial and eurozone debt crises have given birth to a well-known saga of hard cases 
where the jurisdictions of the Court of Justice of the European Union have been given the 
difficult task of assessing the lawfulness of far-reaching financial rescue measures (Pringle,
1
 
OMT
2
) as well as the delegation of new types of executive powers to a Union agency (Short 
selling
3
). The case decided by the General Court in March 2015, which spurred the analysis 
presented here  - Case T-496/11, United Kingdom v. European Central Bank
4
 - was about the 
reach of the ECB’s competences, like OMT. At issue was the ECB’s so-called “location 
policy”, which sought to limit the development of too big and important financial 
infrastructure providers outside the euro area. The policy was formulated as early as 2001 in 
the following way: 
 
“The natural geographical scope for any ‘domestic’ market infrastructure (including 
central counterparty clearing) for securities and derivatives denominated in euro is the 
euro area. Given the potential systemic importance of securities clearing and 
settlement systems, this infrastructure should be located within the euro area”. 5 
 
The policy was never put in practice, but was challenged by the UK, which feared that it 
could eventually pressure London-based clearinghouses to relocate their activities to the euro 
area. In this case, the General Court sided with the applicant, stating that “the ECB does not 
have the competence necessary to regulate the activity of securities clearing systems”, 
including in particular so-called Central Counterparties (CCP).
6
 The ruling made few 
headlines, sovereign bond markets did not plummet, and the case was finally sealed, evidently 
for good, when the parties to the dispute announced that a settlement had been reached. No 
  
1
Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, EU:C:2012:756. 
2
Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag (OMT), EU:C:2015:400. 
3
Case C-270/12, UK Council and Parliament, EU:C:2014:18. 
4
Case T-496/11, UK v. European Central Bank (Location Policy), EU:T:2015:133. 
5ECB, “The Eurosystem’s Policy Line With Regard to Consolidation in Central Counterparty Clearing, 2001” 
(Press release, 27 Sept. 2001). 
6
Case T-496/11, UK v. ECB (Location Policy), para 110. 
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appeal was lodged. As part of the deal, the UK agreed to withdraw all the remaining legal 
actions (altogether three cases were lodged concerning the policy framework). 
Despite its relatively “uneventful” character, UK v. ECB (Location policy) provides a 
rich source and useful point of reference for the purposes of identifying and assessing several 
central legal problems and constitutional tensions surrounding the developing EU financial 
stability regime, and particularly the role of the ECB therein.
7
 This article presents the case 
and its background and then analyses in detail the following three broad problems. 
First, the article considers the implications of the General Court’s central finding, i.e. 
that the ECB has no powers over CCPs or other securities settlement systems. The article 
shows that CCPs, which already handle enormous volumes of transactions every day, should 
not be disregarded as a mere technicality of the financial market’s post-trade “plumbing 
system”.8 In the regulatory response to the financial crisis, much faith has been placed in the 
ability of CCPs to contain and manage systemic risk, especially in the global market for over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives.
9
 CCPs manage systemic risk by concentrating it; thus the most 
logical policy prescription was nicely articulated by Ben Bernanke, the previous Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve of the United States: “If you put all your eggs in one basket, you better 
watch that basket”.10 Indeed, we should not take the fact that CCPs fared relatively well in the 
crisis as indication of their immortality.
11
 However, the argument in favour of centralizing 
supervision of CCPs must also show that oversight is needed precisely at the European level, 
i.e. that the objective of financial stability could not be attained by Member State supervision 
and intervention alone. As will be pointed out, this part of the argument is not as 
straightforward. 
 Secondly, the case and its outcome reveal how the EU financial stability regime is 
excessively focused on banks and the banking system. Indeed, the Banking Union framework 
for supervision (Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM) and crisis management (Single 
Resolution Mechanism, SRM) is solely focused on banks. The underlying problem of the EU 
regime for prudential supervision of financial institutions is that its scope is defined 
institutionally rather than functionally. Here the United States offers a useful point of 
comparison, particularly the broad and functionally defined mandate of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Committee (FSOC). However, the article also notes that first steps have already 
been taken in the EU towards a more comprehensive framework for the management of 
systemic risks stemming from the entire financial system. In particular, the Commission is 
preparing a legislative framework for the recovery and resolution of financial institutions 
other than banks, with a particular focus on CCPs.
12
 With respect to extending the ECB’s 
  
7
 In this article the term “financial stability regime” is used in a narrow sense comprising the institutions, tools 
and policies that are designed to mitigate systemic risks resulting from the failure of individual financial 
institutions including non-bank entities and financial infrastructure providers. Such a regime covers both ex ante 
supervision and ex post crisis management functions. Financial stability regime more broadly understood would 
comprise a much larger set of macroprudential tools and policies, including monetary, for identifying and 
managing systemic risks in the financial system at large. It should also be noted that the difference between 
macroprudential and microprudential policies is hard to draw and in part even semantic. Macroprudential policy 
is nevertheless characterised by its specific objective (limitation of systemic risk), scope (entire financial 
system), and instruments (various tools, which are mostly prudential). See IMF, Macroprudential Policy Tools 
and Frameworks - Progress Report to G20, 27 October 2011, p. 4. For instance, the viability of CCPs and other 
financial market infrastructures is usually considered a macroprudential policy issue, despite the focus is on 
individual institutions. 
8The common “plumbing” metaphor was used, e.g. by Ben Bernanke in his speech “Clearinghouses, Financial 
Stability, and Financial Reform”, given at the 2011 Financial Markets Conference, Stone Mountain, Georgia, 4 
April 2011. 
9Derivatives are either traded bilaterally (hence “over-the-counter”) or through regulated exchanges (exchange-
traded derivatives). 
10
Bernanke, op. cit. supra note 8 (citing Mark Twain’s character Pudd’nhead Wilson). 
11
Ibid. 
12The Commission’s official consultation on recovery and resolution of financial institutions other than banks 
was launched already in October 2012. 
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mandate to cover CCPs, the judgment in UK v. ECB (Location policy) points out an 
interesting exit strategy for fixing the competence gap regarding CCPs. According to the 
Court, this could be done without a Treaty amendment by revising the Statute of the ECB and 
of the ESCB (the ECB/ESCB Statute) via the exception provided under Article 129(3) TFEU. 
This would allow the use of the ordinary legislative procedure. However, the prospect of 
giving the ECB broader regulatory and supervisory powers over systemically important CCPs 
(and other market infrastructures) poses certain difficult questions, both legal and practical. 
This is in large part due to the organizational and operational arrangements adopted within the 
ECB in order to “ring fence” the prudential supervision of banks under the SSM from the 
effective and independent discharge of the ECB’s primary monetary duties. 
The third and final problem to be considered concerns the “single market problem” 
which the Court actually did not need to examine in detail after upholding the UK’s first plea 
regarding competence. The UK had also claimed that the ECB’s location policy infringed the 
key freedoms provided for by the TFEU, in particular the freedom of establishment, freedom 
to provide services and the free movement of capital. This plea reveals the constitutionally 
tensioned relationship between free movement restrictions motivated and justified by 
financial stability concerns, and the single financial market project driven by the founding 
principles of competition and free movement. It is argued that these occasionally conflicting 
rationalities, stemming respectively from what has been called the EU’s microeconomic and 
macroeconomic constitutions,
13
 risk further deepening the jurisdictional wedge between the 
“ins” and the “outs” of the Eurozone. The broader economic policy problem, which in the EU 
is also a constitutional one, is that free movement and unrestricted competition do not 
necessarily go hand in hand with the policy objective of financial stability – unless policy-
making and supervision is centralized (this is known also as the “Financial Trilemma”). 
 
 
2. Validity of the ECB Policy Framework for CCPs: UK v. ECB (Location policy) 
 
2.1. Background: The ECB location policy and the rationale behind it 
 
Clearinghouses reduce the costs and operational risks relating to the post-trade phase of 
financial transactions by centralizing and standardizing specific classes of financial 
transactions.
14
 Clearinghouses differ from exchanges and other market places in that their 
purpose is solely to ensure payment and delivery.
15
 A CCP is a special type of clearinghouse. 
In a nutshell, a CCP centralizes and warehouses risk by interposing itself between buyers and 
sellers of securities and derivatives, thus taking a position of the buyer to every seller and the 
seller to every buyer.
 16
 Clearing of, for instance an OTC derivative contract through a CCP in 
practice means that one contract is replaced by two contracts. This contractual novation 
amounts to a guarantee or insurance for the original counterparties that the contracts will be 
performed. As for the CCP, because the two replacing contracts mirror and offset each other 
perfectly, the CCP does not take a position in the market and in normal times need not to 
  
13
See Kaarlo Tuori and Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone crisis: A constitutional analysis (Cambridge University Press, 
2014); Kaarlo Tuori, European Constitutionalism, (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
14
See e.g. Bernanke, op. cit. supra note 8. 
15Chang, “The systemic risk paradox: Banks and clearinghouses under regulation” Columbia Business Law 
Review (forthcoming), p. 11. Available at SSRN,  <ssrn.com/abstract=2421325> From the late 1990s onwards, 
CCPs have started to distance themselves from exchanges and offer services on a standalone basis, especially to 
OTC derivatives markets. See Hills, Rule, Parkinson and Young, “Central Counterparty Clearing Houses and 
financial stability”, Financial Stability Review, June 1999, Bank of England. 
16
This common definition is adopted also in Art. 2(1) of the EMIR. 
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worry about market risk, i.e. price movements.
17
 Therefore, the primary concern of the CCPs 
is the solvency of its trading counterparties.
18
  In addition to enhanced transparency, risk 
management and loss mutualization, CCPs bring efficiency benefits. Pooling of large amounts 
of transactions allows multilateral netting, i.e. cancelling out of offsetting exposures. Netting 
reduces the interconnectedness of market participants, but it also lowers collateral demands 
and facilitates market exit.
19
 CCPs have become increasingly important especially in the 
global market for OTC derivatives after the policy-makers determined that to prevent another 
financial crisis more derivatives should be centrally cleared. These initiatives will be assessed 
in more detail (in section 3.2) below. 
 The ECB’s interest in CCPs and securities settlement systems is explained by the fact 
that securities transactions have two “legs”, a securities leg and a cash leg, and thus there is a 
direct link between securities settlement systems and payment systems. Therefore 
“disturbances in the transfer of securities may spill over to disruptions of the payment systems 
that are used by the securities settlement systems.”20 Overseeing the functioning of payments 
systems is a task shared by all currency issuing central banks. 
The ECB needs to retain maximum control over its own currency, the euro. One way 
to achieve that objective is to keep critical payment infrastructures (and other infrastructures) 
within the currency area and thus within the central bank’s sphere of oversight and control. To 
that end, the ECB developed a policy according to which “the Eurosystem cannot, as a matter 
of principle, accept that payment infrastructures for euro transactions which are located 
outside the euro area (the home currency area) have the potential to develop into major euro 
payment infrastructures”.21 The scope of the ECB “location policy” reached beyond payment 
systems to cover all market infrastructures, including CCPs, that handle securities and 
derivatives transactions denominated in euro. According to the ECB, these infrastructures, if 
important enough, should all be located within the euro area.
22
 
In its 2011 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework, the ECB further specified its 
location policy, giving more detailed guidance particularly with regard to CCPs.
23
 With 
respect to OTC derivatives in particular, the policy entailed that there is “a need for at least 
one European CCP for credit derivatives” and that “given the potential systemic importance 
of securities clearing and settlement systems, this infrastructure should be located within the 
euro area”.24 The ECB’s 2011 oversight policy also took a step further, setting certain 
quantitative thresholds, the meeting of which would trigger the application of the location 
policy to CCPs. 
This level of granularity was enough for the UK, which brought several actions in the 
General Court seeking annulment of the policy framework insofar as it imposed a location 
requirement applicable to CCPs outside the Eurosystem. The UK’s concern was 
understandable: the policy threatened the position of London as a host for the most important 
CCPs, not only in Europe but also globally. Indeed, London hosts many of the world’s leading 
  
17
See recital 47 of the Commission Delegated Regulation 153/2013 O.J. 2013, L 52: “Given that a CCP’s aim 
should be to have a flat position with regards to market risk, the only risks that a CCP should need to hedge are 
those concerning the collateral that it accepts or the risks arising from the default of a clearing member.” 
18Kress, “Credit default swaps, clearinghouses, and systemic risk: Why centralized counterparties must have 
access to central bank liquidity”, 48 Harvard Journal on Legislation  (2011), 61-62. 
19
Ibid., 66-68; See also Chang, op. cit. supra note 15, p. 19: “Because the DCO has numerous positions to offset, 
the margin that members have to post to maintain their positions will likely be lower than with bilateral 
clearing.” 
20ECB, “Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework”, 5 July 2011, p. 5. 
21
ECB, “The Eurosystem policy principles on the location and operation of infrastructures settling euro-
denominated payment transactions”, 19 July 2007. See also ECB, “The Eurosystem policy principles on the 
location and operation of infrastructures settling euro-denominated payment transactions: Specification of 
'legally and operationally located in the euro area'”, 20 Nov. 2008. 
22
See ECB 2001, cited supra note 5. 
23
ECB, op. cit. supra note 20. 
24
Ibid., p. 10. 
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clearinghouses, two of which stand out in particular: LCH.Clearnet in the area of interest rate 
swaps, and ICE Clear Europe in credit default swaps.
25
 
 
2.2. The Court annuls the ECB location policy 
 
The General Court of the European Union gave its judgment on 4 March 2015 in Case T-
496/11, which was the first of three cases lodged by the UK concerning the above-described 
ECB location policy.
26
 In its pleadings, the ECB acknowledged that it lacked explicit mandate 
to oversee securities settlement systems, but argued that such powers should be construed as 
consequential to its other tasks as laid down in Article 127 TFEU and the ECB/ESCB Statute. 
The ECB relied in particular on Articles 127(1) and 127(2) TFEU as well as on Article 22 of 
the ECB/ESCB Statute.
27
 The primary objective of the ESCB is to maintain price stability 
(Art. 127(1) TFEU), whereas Article 127(2) TFEU provides that the ESCB’s core tasks also 
include the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. Article 22 of the ECB 
Statute further specifies that “the ECB and national central banks may provide facilities, and 
the ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems 
within the Union and with other countries.”  The ECB had already argued that the above legal 
basis, together with the duties to contribute to the stability of the financial system (Art. 127(5) 
TFEU) also grants it oversight and regulatory powers over all kinds of clearing systems, 
including CCPs.
28
 
Moreover, in the ECB’s reasoning the fact that the term “oversight” is unknown in the 
Treaty of Maastricht should be of no consequence, because at the time the Treaty was signed 
“the understanding of oversight as a separate function was only just developing” and therefore 
the omission must have been unintentional. Secondly, at that time “clearing and settlement 
systems had not yet gained the size and relevance that they subsequently acquired, 
particularly on a cross-border basis.”29 To implement the oversight policy, the ECB has 
assumed it had the following powers at its use: moral suasion, public statements, influence on 
direct participants in the relevant systems, cooperation with other authorities, and finally the 
adoption of directly binding regulations within the euro area (a power not used by the ECB).
30
 
 Nevertheless the General Court, after settling the admissibility issues,
31
 ruled on the 
question of competence in favour of the UK, confirming that the “ECB does not have the 
competence necessary to regulate the activity of securities clearing systems” including 
CCPs.
32
 The Court recognized the “existence of very close links between payment systems 
and securities clearing systems”,33 but rejected the ECB's “effect argument” which basically 
asserted that the ECB must have the power to regulate securities clearing infrastructures 
because their default could seriously affect the functioning of payment systems.
34
 In the view 
of the Court, such links, though clearly existing, cannot be held sufficient to justify the 
  
25Barker and Jones, “BoE and ECB settle four-year battle over City clearing houses”, The Financial Times, 29 
March 2015. For a brief description of London-based CCPs, see ECB, “Oversight Report, 2014”, p. 33. 
26
Case T-93/13, UK v. ECB (action brought 15 Feb. 2013) concerned a decision as well as a guideline of the ECB 
concerning the TARGET2 system; in UK v. ECB (Case T-45/12) (action brought 27 Jan. 2012) the UK sought 
the annulment of a separate statement of standards by the ECB insofar as it concerned the location policy. 
27
Case T-496/11, UK v. ECB (Location policy), paras. 86-87. 
28
See Opinion of the European Central Bank of 27 Nov. 2012 on various draft regulatory and implementing 
technical standards submitted by the ESMA to the Commission, O.J. 2012, C 60/1, p. 2  (“The Eurosystem’s 
oversight competence over clearing and payment systems derives from these provisions.”) 
29
As also stated in the ECB’s 2009 Eurosystem oversight report, p. 3. 
30
Ibid., p. 7. 
31
Case T-496/11, UK v. ECB (location policy), paras. 68 and 76. 
32
Ibid., para 110. 
33
Ibid., para 106. 
34
Ibid., para 103. 
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existence of ECB’s implicit powers.35 To construe such powers would be against the principle 
of conferral as laid down in Article 13(2) TEU.
36
 
In other words, the General Court separated securities settlement systems from 
payments systems, both functionally and legally. The Court’s conclusion is reasonable. As 
described above, the business of CCPs is to settle both payments and securities transactions, 
thus their operations entail both a cash leg and a securities leg.
37
 The Court held rightly that 
the securities side of CCPs’ clearing operations per se could not be perceived as constituting 
payments.
38
 While the ECB clearly has competence to adopt regulations to ensure efficiency 
and safety of payment systems (including those with a clearing stage) it has not been granted 
“autonomous regulatory competence in respect of all clearing systems”.39 Moreover, the 
ECB’s location policy clearly reaches beyond oversight. As the ECJ observes: 
 
“the matter at issue is the ECB’s competence to impose, on behalf of the Eurosystem, a 
requirement to be located within the euro area that is applicable to CCPs providing 
clearing services for euro-denominated securities beyond certain thresholds. It is clear 
that creation of such a requirement goes beyond mere oversight of the infrastructures of 
securities clearing systems, and partakes of regulation of their activity.”40 
 
The UK also presented other pleas relating to the substance of the location policy. One stands 
out as particularly interesting and problematic: the UK claimed that the ECB’s location policy, 
if considered to be within the ECB’s powers and thus formally lawful, would directly 
encroach upon the TFEU guaranteed key freedoms, i.e. freedom of establishment, freedom to 
provide services, and the free movement of capital.
41
 Since the Court upheld the first of the 
UK’s pleas regarding competence, it did not need to examine the other pleas. Examination of 
the issues by the Court of Justice will not take place in the near future either, because after the 
General Court’s ruling the parties quickly settled the case. As part of the deal, the UK agreed 
on cessation of all the remaining legal actions. The UK also agreed to enhance information 
exchange and cooperation arrangements between the ECB and the Bank of England, which 
oversees CCPs operating in the UK. In exchange, the ECB agreed not to discontinue, and 
even extend, its common liquidity support arrangements with the Bank of England - thus 
maintaining an important euro liquidity backstop for London-based CCPs.
42
 
 
2.3. Three problems to be considered 
 
The remainder of this article will consider in detail three problems, each of which relates to 
the substance of the above-presented case. First, it is argued that the General Court’s finding 
that the ECB lacks competence to exercise oversight and regulatory control over CCPs is 
problematic from the perspective of financial stability, especially considering the growing 
importance of CCPs on the global markets for financial derivatives. The lack of competence is 
  
35
Ibid., para 107. 
36
Ibid., para 105. 
37
The Court also acknowledged that “in order to carry out its activity, a CCP must have access, first, to a 
payment system enabling liquid assets to be transferred, whether it is operated by a central bank or on a private 
basis, and, second, to a securities settlement system enabling transfer of ownership of the securities and their 
custody.” Ibid., para 44. 
38
Ibid., para 97. 
39
Ibid., para 101. 
40
Ibid., para 84. 
41
Ibid., para 78. The UK also presented three other pleas, which will not be considered in detail here. The third 
plea related to an alleged breach of Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU, fourth plea was on the principle of non-
discrimination (Art. 18 TFEU) and the fifth plea on the principle of proportionality. Ibid. 
42ECB, “European Central Bank and Bank of England announce measures to enhance financial stability in 
relation to centrally cleared markets in the EU”, Press release 29 March 2015. See also Barker and Jones, op. cit. 
supra note 25. 
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symptomatic more generally of certain drawbacks and shortcomings in the patchy architecture 
of the evolving EU financial stability regime, which is too focused on banks. The second 
problem concerns the question of broadening the ECB’s mandate to include CCPs, especially 
the “exit strategy” to expand the ECB’s mandate, as pointed at by the Court. Good grounds 
exist to argue that this interpretation by the Court is too liberal. But what is even more 
problematic, in the event this strategy were to be followed, how exactly would the new 
powers be located within the ECB’s current organizational structure? This problem again 
points at more general structural design issues ignored or overlooked in the construction of 
the Banking Union. Finally, the article briefly assesses certain fundamental constitutional 
problems that arise, first, from the geographic bifurcation of the Union’s constitutional reality 
between the eurozone and the rest of the EU and, second, the likely future clashes between the 
fast evolving and financial stability oriented macroeconomic constitution, and the more 
established and stable microeconomic constitution built on the overarching principles of free 
movement and competition. 
 
 
3. Does the ECB need more powers over CCPs? 
 
The argument in favour of centralizing supervision of CCP’s must satisfy two conditions: 
first, the business of such entities must be such as to be able to cause sufficiently serious 
problems in the financial system, i.e. that they are systemically important. Secondly, it must 
be shown that oversight is needed precisely at the European level, i.e. that the objective of 
financial stability could not be attained by decentralized Member State supervision and 
intervention alone. To that end, this section will next consider the systemic importance of 
CCPs especially in light of the recent developments that have taken place in the global market 
for financial derivatives. After that the need for European level supervision in general and the 
possible role of the ECB in particular will be evaluated. 
 
3.1. CCPs are systemically important 
 
Systemically important financial institutions (also known as SIFIs) are institutions “whose 
disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would 
cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity”.43 Generally 
all financial market infrastructures, such as CCPs and payment systems,
44
 are presumed to be 
systemically important, at least in the jurisdiction in which they are located.
45
 This is first 
because of the sheer amount of transactions they process. CCPs, for instance, typically clear 
transactions worth hundreds of trillions annually.
46
 
The systemic concerns relating to CCPs have been steadily climbing up the priority 
list on the international policy agenda. The Financial Stability Board (FSB)
47
 and its member 
organizations the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPMI) and the 
  
43Financial Stability Board, “Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions, 
FSB Recommendations and Time Lines”, 20 Oct. 2010, p. 1. 
44
Other financial market infrastructures include central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, and 
trade repositories. CPSS-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures - April 2012. 
45
Financial Stability Board, “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions”, 15 Oct. 
2014, p. 57 
46According to the ECB’s figures on 2014, CCPs located within the euro zone “cleared a total of €14.3 trillion in 
cash securities transactions, €121 trillion in repo transactions, and €193 trillion in derivatives transactions.” See 
the Eurosystem Oversight Report 2014.  LCH.Clearnet Ltd.’s SwapClear service, the leading platform for 
interest rate derivatives, cleared in 2014 derivative transactions valued in total more than USD 600 trillion: 
LCH.Clearnet Ltd., Annual Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 31 Dec. 2014, p. 3. 
47
 Established in April 2009, as the successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the FSB is an international 
body, hosted by the BIS, that monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system. 
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International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) have been developing several 
standards and principles for better oversight, risk management, and resolution of CCPs. The 
CPMI and IOSCO are also in the process of initiating a comprehensive review of stress 
testing by CCPs.
48
 
Given their critical role in the everyday functioning of the financial markets, financial 
market infrastructures are sometimes likened to public utilities such as electricity grids.
49
 
Whether they should be regulated as such is a matter of debate, but what is certain is that it is 
in the interest of regulators to ensure continued availability of such infrastructures' services.
50
 
As with systemically important too-big-to-fail banks, the regulators would have little choice 
in a situation where a significant CCP faced difficulties in performing its obligations. The 
consequence of inadequate action would be no less than the likely implosion of the financial 
system.
51
 To fully understand why the CCPs have stepped up from a relatively unknown and 
unregulated market innovation to one of the central concerns of regulators and central banks 
globally, one must appreciate the nature and effects of perhaps the most important of the 
regulatory responses to the financial crisis of 2008, that is, the reform of the OTC derivatives 
markets. 
 
3.2. CCPs and the OTC derivatives reforms 
 
Prior to the financial crisis, the large majority of OTC derivative transactions was executed 
bilaterally outside CCPs, where freedom of contract prevailed and parties did not need to 
worry about mandatory risk management requirements, e.g. on posting collateral. Unchained 
for decades, the OTC derivatives market has reached an enormous size (USD 630 trillion 
notionally
52
) and become extremely globalized. In 2012 around 80 per cent of credit 
derivative transactions had a cross-border element.
53
 The market is also interconnected and 
heavily dominated by certain primary dealers; for instance, at the time of its bankruptcy filing, 
Lehman Brother investment bank had hundreds of thousands of contracts outstanding in the 
OTC derivatives market with around 8,000 different counterparties.
54
 Lehman’s collapse had 
well-known catastrophic consequences in the OTC markets. This was in large part because the 
market participants had systematically undercollateralized counterparty risk.
55
 For OTC 
derivatives that are not cleared through a CCP (bilateral or uncleared OTC derivatives) there 
exists no robust, rule-based system for setting collateral. Therefore “safe clients” such as 
sovereigns and AAA-rated institutions have tended not to post adequate collateral. Moreover, 
systemically important financial institutions, i.e. primary dealers like Lehman Brothers used 
  
48Bank for International Settlements, “CPMI and IOSCO begin review of CCP stress testing”, Press release, 11 
March 2015. 
49
See Singh, “Making OTC derivatives safe: A fresh look”, IMF Working Paper 11/66, 201 (2011), p. 17. 
50See Cœuré, “Central counterparty recovery and resolution”, keynote Speech by Benoît Cœuré, Member of the 
Executive Board of the ECB, At Exchange of Ideas #2, London, 24 Nov. 2014. 
51
Kress, op. cit. supra note 18, 73. See also Levitin, “The tenuous case for derivatives clearinghouses” 101 The 
Georgetown Law Journal (2013), 445 at 463 (“the failure of a clearinghouse would have systemic consequences 
that would be far worse than a dealer bank’s failure”). 
52
Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Review, June 2015, p. 4-5. The number represents the amount of 
all outstanding OTC derivatives contracts, offering an indicator of deal activity. Gross market value of all 
reported derivatives contracts, i.e. the cost of replacing all outstanding contracts at reporting date’s market prices, 
is significantly smaller (USD 21 trillion). 
53See Barnier, “International cooperation: a sine qua non for the success of OTC derivatives markets reforms”, in 
OTC Derivatives: New Rules, New Actors, New Risks, Banque de France, Financial Stability Review, No. 17, 
April 2013. 
54
Hull, Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives (Pearson Education India, 2006), p. 3. 
55Studies indicate that undercollateralization has only got worse after Lehman’s collapse. See Singh, “Collateral, 
netting and systemic risk in the OTC Derivatives Market” IMF Working Paper 10/99 (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund) (2010); Singh and Aitken, “Counterparty risk, impact on collateral flows and role for central 
counterparties”, IMF Working Paper 09/173, 2009. 
 9 
to be, typically post no initial margin to each other for OTC derivative contracts.
56
 As is now 
well known, the triple-A rating of the American Insurance Group (AIG) made its 
counterparties feel secure enough not to require up-front collateral.
57
 The AIG was thus able 
to build up massive exposure by selling Credit Default Swaps (through its London-based 
subsidiary) while hardly committing any capital. 
 While the opaque OTC market collapsed in the crisis, CCPs navigated through the 
turbulence and protected their members from substantial losses primarily without government 
assistance. Therefore, the EU, together with other jurisdictions hosting the world’s most 
important capital markets, enacted laws to fulfil its G-20 commitment to steer more derivative 
instruments to the presumed safety of central clearing.
58
 The Regulation on OTC Derivatives, 
Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (more usually known as the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation, or its acronym: EMIR)
59
 sets a mandatory requirement to clear all 
standardized OTC derivatives through an authorized CCP (Art. 4).
60
 
The derivatives reform means a significant offloading of standardized OTC 
derivatives to CCPs. The majority of OTC derivatives are already cleared through CCPs (60% 
in 2013
61
) and more is expected to follow after the new regulations kick in. Both the EU and 
U.S. have proposed mandatory clearing of interest rate derivatives - which make up the lion’s 
share of the OTC market’s activity.62 The change has been visible also in the credit default 
swap (CDS) markets, where contracts with CCPs accounted for more than a quarter of all 
outstanding (notional) CDS contracts at end-June 2014, a notable increase compared with the 
pre-crisis figures.
63
 For CCPs this means significantly higher volumes. To take one example: 
the number of OTC derivatives contracts cleared by LCH.Clearnet Ltd, a London-based CCP 
that is particularly important for the European derivatives market, has more than doubled 
since 2009.
64
 
 
3.3. Are CCPs safe? 
 
Though it is clear that an uncontrolled failure of a CCP would devastate financial markets, 
perhaps even more than a bank failure, it has been less clear to what extent regulatory 
intervention is needed to counter that threat. CCPs differ from banks in a number of important 
ways. For instance, commercial banks customarily deal with liquidity problems by turning 
first to the inter-bank market to receive short-term funding and take recourse to the central 
bank liquidity assistance only if the inter-bank market is not available, e.g. due to impaired 
  
56
Singh, op. cit. supra note 49, p. 10. 
57
Hull, op. cit. supra note 54, p. 33. 
58
Related initiatives include moving more derivative trades on regulated exchanges and other organized trading 
venues, and subjecting the remaining, non-standardized and uncleared OTC derivatives to stringent risk 
mitigation requirements. In particular, the G20 leaders declared in 2009 that “all standardized OTC derivative 
contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through 
central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade 
repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements.” Group of 20, 
Declaration, Pittsburgh summit, September 2009. 
59
Regulation (EU) 648/2012 of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, 
O.J. 2012, L 201/1. 
60
However the mandatory clearing requirement becomes effective only after a derivative has been declared 
subject to the clearing obligation. 
61Deutsche Börse, “How Central Counterparties Strengthen the Safety and Integrity of Financial Markets” (July 
2014), p. 7. 
62
In fact, by the end of 2013, around 65 % of outstanding notional interest rate derivative contracts was already 
cleared through CCPs. See ISDA, Size and Uses of the Non-Cleared Derivatives Market: An ISDA Study (April 
2014). 
63
BIS, op. cit. supra note 52. 
64See Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, “Statistics on payment, clearing and settlement  
systems in the CPMI countries, Figures for 2013” (December 2014), p. 414 (data on the value of cleared 
contracts is not available). 
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balance sheet and lack of confidence.
65
 Unlike the case in the typical banking business, 
possible liquidity needs of CCPs result from the defaults of their members, not from the 
maturity mismatch between their assets (loans) and liabilities (deposits): in other words their 
liability side is not at the risk of a run. CCPs have developed sophisticated risk management 
systems to handle member defaults. First of all, they only accept trades from their direct 
members and apply strict membership criteria.
66
 Most crucially, CCPs apply a special 
margining system and sophisticated default management processes.
67
 The CCPs require 
collateral (margins) from each of their members, who must also make payments to a special 
default fund.
68
 Moreover, in the event a CCP member defaults and its posted margin and 
default fund contributions prove inadequate, the CCP has the ability to mutualize the loss 
among its clearing members, e.g. through a mutualized default fund.
69
 In other words, CCPs 
“sit atop a fortress of margin pledged by members to collateralize trades”,70 i.e. the costs 
arising from a default of a member of the CCP are borne by the members of the CCP 
themselves.
71
 As pointed out by Benoît Cœuré of the ECB: “A key difference between banks 
and CCPs is that a CCP’s recovery plan can be based on contractual agreements with its 
members. …CCPs are in a unique position in drawing on additional resources from members 
if and when needed.”72 
That CCPs have become prominent risk managers of the global financial system is not 
without merit. Most CCPs have thus far been able to manage and contain crises without (at 
least direct) government funding.
73
 For instance, the London-based LCH.Clearnet Ltd’s 
default history comprises seven defaults and three “near misses”, but none of the events 
threatened its viability.
74
 The most serious test was presented by Lehman’s default, which the 
LCH.Clearnet Ltd managed through a specific and pre-tested process where affected positions 
were basically auctioned off as a package. This strategy proved to be highly successful: the 
margin posted by Lehman was sufficient to manage the auctioning process and hedge the risks 
involved. In fact, LCH.Clearnet Ltd returned a significant amount of Lehman’s margin pot to 
the administrators.
75
 On the other hand, LCH.Clearnet SA, a French CCP (which is a part of 
  
65Campbell and Lastra, “Revisiting the Lender of Last Resort”, 24 Banking & Finance Law Review (2009), 453, 
463 - noting however, that the way banks fund lending has undergone a significant transformation in recent 
years: instead of using deposits, banks increasingly fund their lending activities through money markets, where 
they borrow large sums for fixed periods. This is commonly combined with securitization of loan portfolios. 
Ibid. 
66EMIR defines “clearing member” as an undertaking which participates in a CCP and which is responsible for 
discharging the financial obligations arising from that participation (Art. 2(1)(14)). 
67See Allen, “Derivatives clearinghouses and systemic risk: A bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank analysis.” 64 Stanford 
Law Review (2012), 1089-1090. 
68Margins comprise a fixed component paid up front, called the “initial margin” and a “variation margin”, which 
reflects changes in the value of open positions. See e.g. Feder, “Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives” 
2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. (2002), p. 733-734. 
69
Kress, op. cit. supra note 18, 63. Koeppl and Monnet, “Emergence and Future of Central Counterparties” FRB 
of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 10-30 (2010). Available at SSRN: <ssrn.com/abstract=1687862>. 
70
Chang, op. cit. supra note 15, p. 30. 
71
However, the CCP operator is itself responsible for other types of risks such as operational risks or failures in 
the collateral and liquidity management systems. Such losses are covered by the CCP’s regulatory capital, 
insurance or through other contingent resources. See LCH.Clearnet White Paper, “CCP Risk Management, 
Recovery, and Resolution”, p. 4. 
72“Central counterparty recovery and resolution”, Keynote Speech by Benoît Cœuré, member of the Executive 
Board of the ECB, At Exchange of Ideas #2, London, 24 Nov. 2014. 
73
However, the statement that CCPs survived the financial crisis without government support is to a certain 
extent misleading. As noted by Ben Bernanke, “the official sector's support arrangements for financial firms and 
markets … also indirectly eased liquidity pressures on the clearinghouses”. Bernanke, op. cit. supra note 8. 
74See LCH.Clearnet’s Default History, available from <www.lchclearnet.com/risk-collateral-management/risk-
management-overview> (last visited 12 Oct. 2015). 
75
For a brief description of the process, see Allen, op. cit. supra note 67, 1089-1090. 
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LCH.Clearnet Group and a sister company of LCH.Clearnet Ltd) needed to access the 
liquidity facilities of the Bank of France in managing the Lehman Brothers default.
76
 
However, the use of a CCP does not, strictly speaking, reduce the risks inherent in 
derivatives transactions, but rather reallocates and centralizes the risk to a facility that 
specializes in managing it. Roe claims that there is a fundamental misunderstanding among 
policymakers about this underlying risk transfer function of CCPs. If a loss arises from a 
counterparty failure, a CCP can transfer the loss elsewhere but it cannot eliminate it.
77
 
Therefore, according to Roe, the promise to confine financial contagion with the help of CCPs 
is at least “oversold”;78 at the same time, the possibility that the CCPs themselves become too 
big to fail is often overlooked.
79
 This overconfidence, as so often the case in financial 
markets, seems to be based on the assumption that history repeats itself. But things have not 
stayed equal: the regulatory overhaul of the derivatives markets is actually changing CCP 
business. As mentioned above, Lehman’s fall happened at a time when most OTC derivatives, 
especially the key categories of Credit Default Swaps and many Interest Rate Swaps, where 
executed outside clearinghouses. After the post-crisis reforms, CCPs are rapidly increasing 
their gravitational pull for new types of financial derivatives. This changes their risk profile 
because “as CCPs begin to clear more complex, less liquid, and longer-term instruments, their 
potential need for funding support in extremis will rise”.80 
It is also likely that given the new and rapidly expanding market for clearing eligible 
derivatives, CCPs start facing increased competition pressures. The insurance provided by 
CCPs is costly for market participants in comparison to the bilateral OTC markets, where 
prior to the crisis well-rated market participants could trade while committing little capital or 
none at all. Moving these contracts to the bosom of the CCPs will require a bulk of good-
quality collateral.
81
 A CCP may therefore have an incentive to start competing for market 
share at the cost of capitalization, thus in fact increasing leverage and systemic risk.
82
 CCPs 
could under-price risk, for example, through setting low margin requirements, relaxing capital 
and membership requirements, or demanding less information from their clearing members.
83
 
The European regulator has acknowledged the risk of under-pricing, noting that “CCPs should 
not reduce their margins to a level that compromises their safety as a result of the existence of 
a highly competitive environment”.84 
 
3.4. The developing EU framework for CCPs 
  
76BIS, “Payment, clearing and settlement systems in the euro area” (2012), p. 113. 
77“Clearinghouses are merely a device to reduce the risk that stems from a dealer-bank failure. They are not 
general systemic risk panaceas.” Levitin, op. cit. supra note 51, 465. 
78
Roe, “Clearinghouse Overconfidence” 101 California Law Review (2013), 1644. 
79Ibid., 1645 also noting that “clearinghouse construction may move regulators from having to bail out a 
systemically dangerous failed financial institution to having to bail out a systemically dangerous clearinghouse.” 
Ibid., 1648. See also Kress, op. cit. supra note 18, 72 (“Instead of reducing systemic risk, CCPs may simply 
redistribute and concentrate dangers within the financial system”). 
80
Singh, op. cit. supra note 49, p. 10. 
81
Ibid., p. 3. It should be noted that efficient multilateral netting, which is one of the primary benefits of CCPs, 
can reduce the amount of required collateral. But increased competition between CCPs and easier entrance to the 
derivatives clearing market is likely to hamper reaching efficient netting across a broad range of derivatives. See 
ibid., p. 5-6 (noting that  “A single CCP with an adequate multicurrency central bank liquidity backstop that is 
regulated and supervised and spans the broadest range of derivatives would have been an ideal 'first best' 
solution.”). 
82This can introduce a problem of “ruinous competition” which is familiar from the insurance markets: at times, 
regulatory interventions in the form of direct insurance rates regulation have been needed to protect 
policyholders from the ultimate dangers caused by systematic under-pricing of risk. The danger of “ruinous 
competition” has been referred to by both Chang, op. cit. supra note 15, p. 24-25 and Levitin, op. cit. supra note 
51, 464. Both refer to an article by Borselli, “Insurance rates regulation in comparison with open competition”, 
18 Connecticut Insurance Law Journal (2011), 112. 
83
Levitin, op. cit. supra note 51, 463. 
84
Recital 23 of Commission Delegated Regulation 153/2013 of 19 Dec. 2012, O.J. 2012, L 52/41. 
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Considering the risks involved, it is comforting that CCPs remain on the radar of the EU 
legislature. The EU regulatory framework for CCPs is laid down in the EMIR and its various 
implementing regulations. Before the adoption of the EMIR, the EU hosted divergent 
Member State regimes for CCPs; for instance, in some Member States CCPs needed to be 
formally recognized, while in others they could operate without recognition.
85
 The EMIR 
harmonized the requirements for conducting CCP business at a very detailed level, setting 
rules on authorization (Art. 14), capital requirements (Art. 16), organizational requirements 
and governance (Arts. 26 through 35) and conduct of business (Arts. 36 through 39), for 
example. The EMIR also introduces several prudential requirements regarding risk 
management. 
 Supervision of CCPs under the EMIR remains the prerogative of Member State 
authorities.
86
 Many CCPs nevertheless operate cross-border and typically have members from 
various countries. For that reason, the EU regulation of CCPs resembles the pre-crisis EU 
banking regulation which allocated supervisory responsibilities between home and host 
Member State national supervisors, while banking groups operating cross-border were also 
supervised by colleges of supervisors.
87
 Article 18 of the EMIR requires the establishment of 
supervisory colleges with broad membership, ranging from ESMA and various national 
competent authorities to the central banks of issue of the most relevant Union currencies of 
the financial instruments cleared.
88
 Supervisory colleges facilitate and ensure exchange of 
information, voluntary entrustment of tasks among its members, the coordination of 
supervisory examination programmes, and the determination of procedures and contingency 
plans to address emergency situations.
89
 
The EU-level supervisory duties are divided between the ESMA and the ECB. The 
ESMA has a seat in every supervisory college. Notwithstanding that the ruling in UK v. ECB 
(Location policy) stripped the ECB of its presumed regulatory and oversight competences 
with respect to CCPs in general, the ECB still exercises certain important functions. The ECB 
is represented in several colleges of supervisors because it acts as the “Central Bank of 
Issuer” in every CCP established within the EU but outside the euro area.90 Therefore, the 
ECB represents the Eurosystem in the EMIR colleges of five CCPs situated outside the euro 
area (four of them are established in the UK and one in Sweden).
91
 In one important respect 
CCP colleges are different from supervisory colleges for cross-border banks: they also play a 
role in authorizing a CCP.
92
 In certain exceptional cases of disagreement, the authorization 
can even be referred to the ESMA who should make the ultimate determination on the 
  
85
As also noted in the Commission FAQ on EMIR. 
86
Art. 22 of the EMIR. 
87See Moloney, “European Banking Union: Assessing its risks and resilience” 51 CML Rev., 1617-8. 
88The complete list is the following: (a) ESMA; (b) the CCP’s competent authority; (c) the competent authorities 
responsible for the supervision of the clearing members of the CCP that are established in the 3 Member States 
with the largest contributions to the default fund of the CCP; (d) the competent authorities responsible for the 
supervision of trading venues served by the CCP; (e) the competent authorities supervising CCPs with which 
interoperability arrangements have been established; (f) the competent authorities supervising central securities 
depositories to which the CCP is linked; (g) the relevant members of the ESCB responsible for the oversight of 
the CCP and the relevant members of the ESCB responsible for the oversight of the CCPs with which 
interoperability arrangements have been established; (h) the central banks of issue of the most relevant Union 
currencies of the financial instruments cleared.) 
89
Art. 18(4) of the EMIR. In addition, Art. 23 provides a general cooperation requirement for the national 
competent authorities to cooperate closely with each other, with the European Securities Markets Authority 
(ESMA) and, when necessary, with the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 
90ECB, “Eurosystem oversight report 2014”, February 2015, 30. 
91
Ibid., p. 33 (the UK-based CCPs are CME Clearing Europe, ICE Clear Europe, LCH.Clearnet Limited, LME 
Clear Limited (observer status)). 
92
Recital 57 of the EMIR lays down the principle in the following way: “A CCP should not be authorized where 
all the members of the college, excluding the competent authorities of the Member State where the CCP is 
established, reach a joint opinion by mutual agreement that the CCP should not be authorized.” 
 13 
conformity with Union law. Other than this, the ESMA has no voting rights on the opinions of 
the college.
93
 
 
3.5. The emerging crisis management framework for CCPs 
 
The EMIR framework establishes a detailed and directly applicable rulebook for European 
CCPs. However, CCPs are not covered by a recovery and resolution framework similar to that 
established under the Banking Union (see Section 4.1). The Commission is on course to 
change this state of affairs, as it is preparing a legislative proposal regarding recovery and 
resolution of financial institutions other than banks, with a particular focus on CCPs. 
According to the published road map of the Commission, the envisaged reforms “would 
require CCPs to design comprehensive recovery plans to mitigate distress and equip national 
authorities with standardized tools such that they can intervene in the public interest to 
manage the failure of a CCP in an orderly manner, countering the possible negative 
repercussions on financial stability and ensuring the costs associated with its failure are borne 
by the shareholders and creditors of the institution without recourse to public funds.”94 
The Commission’s work coincides with increased international attention being given 
to the safety of financial market infrastructures and other systemically relevant non-bank 
financial institutions.
 95
 The Financial Stability Board updated in October 2014 its important 
document “Key attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions”, 
incorporating specific guidance on the application of the principles to non-bank financial 
institutions such as insurers and financial market infrastructures. The Key Attributes provide 
the “umbrella standard for resolution regimes covering financial institutions of all types that 
could be systemic in failure”.96 A complementary set of standards is provided by the CPMI 
and IOSCO in their “Principles for financial market infrastructures”.97 The updated principles 
seek to harmonize and strengthen the international standards for systemically important 
financial market infrastructures, incorporating specific guidance on CCPs dealing with OTC 
derivatives.
98
 The CPMI and IOSCO published additional guidance on the recovery of 
financial market infrastructures in 2014.
99
 
The EU regulatory initiatives will provide a welcome addition to the EU’s regulatory 
framework for CCPs and other non-bank financial institutions. However, the proposals leave 
open certain difficult questions with regard to the division of supervisory tasks between 
Member State authorities and the EU authorities, and particularly the role of the ECB and 
other central banks (both Eurosystem and non-eurosystem) as providers of emergency funding 
for CCPs. 
 
3.6. The critical role of central banks 
 
Regulatory authorities such as ESMA cannot replace the critical function of central banks 
which can provide quick and limitless emergency funding in times of stress.
 100
 The preamble 
  
93
Art. 17(4) and 19(3) of the EMIR. 
94
See Commission Roadmap, “Framework for resolution of financial institutions other than banks”, April 2015. 
95It should be noted that the work started already in 2012 with a consultation: Commission, “Consultation on a 
possible framework for the recovery and resolution of financial institutions other than banks”, 5 Oct. 2012. 
96
FSB, “Key attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions”, 15 Oct. 2014, 2 
97
CPMI-IOSCO, Principles for financial market infrastructures. April 2012. 
98
Ibid., p. 5. 
99
CPMI-IOSCO, Recovery of financial market infrastructures, October 2014. 
100“Now central banks in Europe and the US are turning their attention to developing frameworks that ensure the 
system can keep functioning when a clearing house runs into trouble – and without governments picking up the 
bill”. Stafford, “‘Too big to fail’ worries reach clearing houses”, Financial Times, 2 Dec. 2014. See also Stafford, 
“Clearing houses may face new capital rules”, Financial Times, 24 Nov., 2014 and Stafford, “Centralised risk 
raises systemic worries over derivatives”, Financial Times, 28 April 2015. 
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to the EMIR acknowledges that the ESCB is responsible for promoting the smooth operation 
of payment systems and that therefore its members also oversee clearing and payment 
systems.
101
 In most cases in the euro area the oversight function is exercised by national 
central banks under national law competences, and it is the role of the Eurosystem to ensure 
effective coordination.
102
 It is commonly recognized that due to the critical importance of 
CCPs, they should have direct access to central bank liquidity.
103
 In the U.S., the Dodd-Frank 
Act explicitly made available the Federal Reserve tap for critical financial market 
infrastructures (see section 4.2 below). In a similar vein, the ECB has pointed out that CCPs 
should have “access to central bank liquidity in the currency in which the products cleared are 
denominated.”104 This latter statement reveals the fundamental problem concerning CCPs 
operating within the eurozone from outside the ESCB jurisdiction. The problem is elucidated 
by the following remark: 
 
“The key commercial problem for CCPs in the UK is [the] absence of any entitlement 
to access euro liquidity facilities from the ECB/ESCB …. In principle, the Bank of 
England could provide euro liquidity but as it does not have the power to print euros, 
it would have to liquidate the UK’s foreign reserves, or borrow from the ECB 
itself.”105 
 
This explains why the ECB continuously has in place common liquidity support arrangements 
with the Bank of England. This arrangement ensures that in case a London-based CCP should 
run into trouble, the ECB can step in quickly, even if formally no commitment to provide 
liquidity exists.
106
 It should be noted that the Swap arrangement between the Bank of England 
and the ECB is not unusual: the ECB similarly relies on dollar liquidity lines from the Federal 
Open Market Committee of the United States.
107
 
The possibility of unlimited central bank liquidity, even if discretionary, brings with it 
the usual moral hazard problem. As is the case with banks, this alone makes a good case for 
supervision of CCPs. But the question still remains on which level the supervision should be 
exercised. 
 
3.7. The case for more European oversight 
 
That the EU should act only when and insofar as the objectives cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States is inherent to EU law through the requirement of subsidiarity 
(Art. 5 TEU). The case for centralization of financial supervision and of policy-making is 
often formulated as a theoretical case for preventing uncoordinated actions based on 
misaligned incentives that could lead to outcomes detrimental to the interests of the Union as 
a whole. 
  
101
Recital 11 of the EMIR. 
102ECB, “Eurosystem oversight policy framework”, July 2011, p. 5. 
103
See e.g. Chamorro-Courtland, “The Trillion dollar question: Can a central bank bail-out a Central 
Counterparty (CCP) Clearing House which is' too big to fail'?” (2012) Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial 
& Commercial Law, 434 (including the sources cited in footnote 9). See also Kress, op. cit. supra note 18, 51 
(and part V more broadly). 
104
ECB, Credit Default Swaps and Counterparty Risk (2009), p. 51. 
105
House of Lords, EU Economic and Financial Affairs Sub-Committee, Review of the EU financial regulatory 
framework Written and Oral evidence (Written evidence by Graham Bishop, p.138). 
106ECB, “European Central Bank and Bank of England announce measures to enhance financial stability in 
relation to centrally cleared markets in the EU”, Press release, 29 March 2015. See also Barker and Jones, op. cit. 
supra note 25. 
107As noted by Lastra, “Since December 2007, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has authorized 
dollar liquidity swap lines with the European Central Bank and other central banks to provide liquidity in U.S. 
dollars to overseas markets”. Lastra, “The Evolution of the European Central Bank”, Queen Mary University of 
London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 99/2012, p. 9 (footnote 17). 
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Perhaps the strongest general argument in favour of centralization of financial 
supervision is articulated by the Financial Trilemma, which maintains that the three policy 
objectives (1) financial stability, (2) financial integration and (3) national financial policies are 
by definition impossible to realize simultaneously. Two of the three objectives can be 
achieved, but not all three at the same time.
108
 The incompatibility is primarily due to the 
public good nature of financial stability, which basically means that not all nations share the 
same incentives to internalize the costs of containing systemic risks. National authorities are 
prone to prioritize domestic objectives at the expense of others, protect the domestic financial 
system and taxpayers, and thus ignore what economists call cross-border externalities.
109
 
The economic logic of the Financial Trilemma could even be translated into a 
democratic answer to problems created by interdependence: according to one narrative, the 
crisis is a democratic failure to address the growing interdependence among the Member 
States. The absence of European politics and the excessive reliance on (or even imprisonment 
to) national politics reveals “the real EU democratic deficit”.110 However, needless to say, the 
transfer of powers to the European level will hardly be enough to remedy the democratic 
deficit if the transfer itself lacks democratic legitimacy.
111
 
In Europe, given the continuing emphasis on the completion of the single market and 
the status of financial stability as an overarching policy objective, the Financial Trilemma 
provides a strong case in favour of centralization of direct supervisory powers. Indeed, the 
approach has been explicitly mentioned as one of the intellectual justifications for the 
Banking Union: “[t]he Banking Union is a tool to deal with [the problems relating to the 
financial trilemma] by replacing national for supranational responsibility”.112 With regard to 
CCPs and other financial market infrastructures, the ECB’s oversight policy in 2011 spells out 
similar concerns about misaligned incentives as well as lack of access to information. 
According to the ECB if a crisis situation materializes outside its sphere of influence, access 
to “timely information from the infrastructure might not be possible, and the [national] central 
bank with primary oversight responsibility might – in its policy actions – focus more on 
addressing the consequences for its own currency and financial system.”113 This might again 
cause cross-border externalities and be detrimental to the Union as a whole. 
Nevertheless, supervision and oversight of CCPs remains the task of national central 
banks of the Eurosystem and they also act as the first lender of last resort for such 
infrastructures. To a certain extent, the lack of express regulatory and oversight powers of the 
ECB with respect to CCPs is of less consequence when it comes to CCPs that are situated 
within the eurozone. Common currency arguably diminishes the problem of misaligned 
incentives. However, just like with banks, too-big-to-fail CCPs are excessively linked to 
sovereign funds and, ultimately, actions of national Eurosystem central banks such as the 
granting of credit lines through emergency liquidity assistance could interfere with the ECB’s 
  
108Schoenmaker, “The financial trilemma” 111 Economics Letters (2011), 57-59. 
109Schoenmaker, “Banking supervision and resolution: The European dimension” 6 Law and Financial Markets 
Review (2012), 52-60. 
110
Poiares Maduro, A New governance for the European Union and the Euro: Democracy and Justice, 
Compendium of Notes (2012), European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy 
Department C: Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs (PE 474.438) “… no effective mechanisms were 
available to ensure that the fiscal policies of a Euro-Member State would take into account the interests of the 
other Member States. This can be presented as a form of democratic externality that is favoured by deeper 
integration and the interdependence it creates. The crisis makes clear our interdependence but also our failure to 
internalize its consequences. This failure is a democratic failure.”, Ibid. p. 31. 
111
 See especially, Scharpf, “Legitimacy intermediation in the multilevel European polity and its collapse in the 
euro crisis”, MPIfG Discussion Paper No. 12/6, 2012. 
112See Commission, “Economic Review of the Financial Regulation Agenda”, a Staff Working Document 
(accompanying the document “A reformed financial sector for Europe”, COM(2014)279), p. 134. 
113
ECB 2011, p. 9 (emphasis added). 
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monetary policy duties.
114
 Decentralised supervision of CCPs becomes problematic especially 
when a too-big-to-fail CCP is also one that is too big to save by actions of its home central 
bank alone. In the case of banks, it has been argued that the supervisory responsibilities that 
have been moved to the European level in the form of the SSM should be followed by such 
macroeconomic emergency powers.
115
 The same argument can be applied to CCPs: if the 
ECB were to receive more oversight powers over systemically important CCPs the size of 
which clearly exceeded the capacity of national central banks to provide credible liquidity 
support in an emergency situation, the ECB should also be the central bank in charge of the 
decision-making on the provision of liquidity assistance. 
An important difference to banks is that euro area CCPs are already more in the grips 
of the ECB because they are firmly integrated in the Eurosystem’s payment and settlement 
infrastructures. Euro area CCPs typically manage payment and settlement risk by making the 
majority of payments in central bank money via a specific settlement system called 
TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer 
system).
116
 Moreover, the recently launched T2S system (TARGET2 Securities) provides a 
single platform for securities settlement in central bank money. On the other hand, non-euro 
area CCPs (or “offshore” CCPs as the ECB often calls them), cannot be as tightly integrated 
into the Eurosystem’s settlement and payment systems. For instance, national central banks of 
the Member States not participating in the euro may only connect to TARGET2 indirectly by 
concluding an agreement with the central banks of the Eurosystem.
117
 
Therefore, even if the ECB does not have formal powers to regulate CCPs, whether 
they are located in the euro area or not, it can exert regulatory pressure on euro area CCPs by 
way of regulating the payment and securities settlement systems as well as the access to such 
systems that are vital for CCP business. This is not the case with non-euro area CCPs. While 
cooperative arrangements with offshore authorities can mitigate stability concerns, they 
cannot replace direct oversight and control.
118
 The problems are technical, but fundamentally 
political because the risks are ultimately borne by euro area taxpayers. 
To conclude, there are good arguments in favour of consolidating CCP supervision at 
the European level and such powers should also be accompanied with the necessary powers 
on emergency liquidity assistance. However, this matter was not part of the substance of Case  
T-496/11, UK v. ECB (Location policy). In fact, to author’s knowledge, the ECB has not been 
actively lobbying for such powers. The ECB’s primary concern has been the “offshore CCPs” 
established in London. In case such a CCP needs a liquidity injection in euros, and the deficit 
were so large it exceeded the reserves of the Bank of England, the ECB would be the central 
bank next in line. The commitment might be substantial.
119
 Therefore, the most interesting 
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Banks provide a useful comparison here too. See Goyal et al., “A Banking Union for the euro area”, IMF Staff 
discussion note, February 2013, p. 11. (“Banks can place deposits and refinance eligible assets with the 
Eurosystem and, if collateral constraints bind, resort to emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) from their national 
central banks. While the ECB’s Governing Council has authority to ensure that LOLR activities by national 
central banks do not interfere with common monetary policy, losses arising on ELA remain the responsibility of 
the national central banks, which exacerbate sovereign-bank linkages”) 
115
Lastra, “Banking Union and Single Market: Conflict or companionship?”, 36 Fordham Int. Law Journal 
(2013), p. 1215-16 (footnote 82) (“In future, for the credit institutions for which the supervisory responsibility is 
moved to the ECB, it would make full sense that the decision whether or not to grant ELA is taken by the ECB.”) 
116
TARGET2 provides a single technical platform for the processing of Euro denominated payments in central 
bank money and with immediate finality. See the ECB’s website on TARGET2 
<www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2/html/index.en.html> On the legal basis, see ECB, “Legal Framework of the 
Eurosystem and the European System of Central Banks”, July 2014, p. 31-32. 
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See ECB, ibid., p. 32. 
118ECB, “Eurosystem oversight policy framework 2011”, p. 9-10. 
119
See Written evidence by Graham Bishop, cited supra note 105, p. 138-139. “If heavy losses were at all likely, 
the ECB’s paid-in capital to meet such losses is only €7.6 billion so it might have to call for fresh capital from 
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'nuke' exploded? Or how quickly the loan would be repaid?” House of Lords, EU Economic and Financial 
Affairs Sub-Committee, Review of the EU financial regulatory framework Written and Oral evidence. 
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question for the moment is, if the ECB were handed explicit powers over CCPs sometime in 
the future (which will be topic of section 4 below) how would a Court assess another attempt 
by the ECB at installing a Location policy or a similar instrument designed to curtail the 
increasing importance of London-based CCPs? This article can only point at some 
fundamental constitutional controversies involved in such a judgment (see section 5). 
 
 
4. Breaking up Europe’s love affair with its banks 
 
4.1. Banking Union’s limited focus 
 
The Banking Union set up a single European framework for banking supervision (SSM
120
), a 
single framework for the resolution of banks and financial institutions (Single Resolution 
Mechanism, SRM
121
), and eventually it should lead to a common deposit guarantee scheme. 
In carrying out its tasks as the single supervisor,
122
 the ECB will be considered, as 
appropriate, the competent or designated authority in the participating Member States, though 
national authorities remain the principal holders of macro-prudential powers.
123
 Under the 
SSM, the ECB is responsible for the supervision of currently 123 systemically important 
European banks, of which holdings amount to more than 80 per cent of banking assets in the 
euro area.
124
 If the preventive supervision fails, the SRM will enable centralized, orderly 
management of a failing bank with the help of a Single Resolution Fund. The SRM also sets 
uniform rules and procedures for the resolution of European banks falling under its remit, thus 
implementing the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).
125
 Moreover, these rules 
and procedures will be applied by a new Union agency, the Single Resolution Board, together 
with the Council and the Commission as well as the national authorities within the SRM 
framework. Finally, if both the bail-in mechanism of the SRM and the support of the Single 
Resolution Fund prove insufficient, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) can under the 
“ESM direct recapitalization instrument” recapitalize banks directly.126 
The Banking Union installed a system of executive supervisory governance, which 
truly is a “constitutional and political novelty”.127 The system combines preventive ex ante 
supervisory and recovery arrangements with forms of ex post centralized resolution measures. 
Given the multitude of political, institutional, and legal constraints, it is easy to agree that the 
project has been surprisingly successful.
128
 The Banking Union is not watertight and too much 
emphasis has arguably been put on preventive supervision while leaving important 
macroprudential tasks to the Member States.
129
 However, the scope of the EU framework for 
  
120
The SSM rests on two legislative acts: Council Regulation 1024/2013, O.J. 2013, L 287/63 (the SSM 
Regulation) and Regulation 1022/2013, O.J. 2012, L 287 (Amended EBA Regulation). 
121
Regulation 806/2014, O.J. 2014, L 225 (SRM Regulation). Part of the SRM is founded on an Inter-
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122
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measures (Art. 5(2)). 
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See the European Stability Mechanism, ESM direct bank recapitalization instrument adopted, press release, 8 
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Moloney, op. cit. supra note 87, 1612. 
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Ibid. 
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 Kern, “European Banking Union: a Legal and institutional analysis of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and 
the Single Resolution Mechanism”, 40 European Law Review (2015), p. 154-187, 171. 
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financial supervision and resolution also reflects well what has recently been dubbed Europe’s 
“love affair with its banks.”130 Under Article 1(2) of the SSM Regulation, the scope of the 
ECB’s supervisory tasks is strictly limited to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. 
The SRM framework similarly covers only credit institutions and certain parent undertakings 
such as financial holding companies (Art. 2(1)(b)). The ultimate focus on banks is in part 
dictated by the SSM’s legal basis (Art. 127(6) TFEU), which automatically rules out tasks 
such as consumer protection as well as supervision of non-bank institutions, regardless of 
their systemic relevance.
131
 Prudential supervision of central counterparties is expressly 
carved out from the remit of the Banking Union.
132
 
 If Europe wishes to continue down its path of integration and single market creation, 
as it is at present doing, especially in the areas of capital markets and post-trade financial 
market infrastructures, there are good reasons to believe that the Banking Union, as it stands, 
is not complete. After the financial crisis and the findings on how non-bank actors contributed 
and worsened the crisis (the “shadow banking system” has become the predominant catch-all 
term), one can safely conclude that “the assumption that only regulated banks matter to 
stability is manifestly false.”133 Non-bank financial institutions, such as insurers and hedge 
funds, can become systemically important, too. This has been painstakingly illustrated by the 
bail-out experiences in the U.S. of the American Insurance Group (2008) and, even earlier, the 
hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (1987). Blackrock, the world’s biggest asset 
management firm, manages assets worth around 5 trillion (equalling roughly the economic 
size of Japan).
134
 Therefore, the problem of too-big-to-fail is very much present outside the 
banking sector as well. 
 In the future, notwithstanding the abundance of Treaty and political obstacles some of 
which may seem insurmountable, a more functional and institutionally less constrained focus 
would be needed to appreciate the dynamism of global financial markets. To that end, before 
assessing the possibilities of broadening the scope of the EU’s supervisory system and certain 
legal and other problems involved in such an endeavour, it is useful to look at the system that 
has been set up on the other side of the Atlantic. 
 
4.2. The US framework – The Financial Stability Oversight Council 
 
The U.S. has since 2010 had a new macro-prudential regulatory authority. The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)
135
 established the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) which is tasked with identifying and 
responding to “the risks to the financial stability that could arise from the material financial 
distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies or 
nonbank financial companies, or that could arise outside the financial services 
marketplace”.136 The FSOC consists of a broad range of Federal regulatory bodies and is 
chaired by the Treasury Secretary.
137
 
  
130Davies, “A capital-markets union is highly unlikely to end Europe's love affair with its banks.” <www.project-
syndicate.org>, 15 Feb. 2015. 
131
See also Moloney, op. cit supra note 87, p. 1631. 
132
On the institutional limits, see generally Moloney, ibid. 
133Tucker, “The political economy of macroprudential regimes”, in Schoenmaker (Ed.) Macroprudentialism 
(VoxEU.org, CEPR, 2014), p. 62. Tucker notes that in the case of Eurozone, it seems to be unclear whether there 
is a macroprudential authority or not: “Will the ECB’s new microprudential body determine macroprudential 
policy for the currency area’s banking system? What about capital markets and shadow banking? Or, as 
elsewhere in the EU, is macroprudential policy still a national competence within the monetary union?” Ibid. 
134Nelson, “Bond swings so extreme even Blackrock rewrites risk measures”, www.bloomberg.com, 15 June 
2015. 
135
Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (The Dodd-Frank Act). 
136
Section 112 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
137
The Member Agencies of the FSOC are the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Housing Finance Agency, 
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 The FSOC not only oversees also non-bank financial companies but also has the 
power to subject them to enhanced supervision and prudential standards. Meeting certain 
requirements, the FSOC can designate a nonbank financial company as systemically 
important and thus subject the company to regulation by the Federal Reserve.
138
 What is 
important, the FSOC can also designate “financial market utilities”139 (including CCPs) as 
systemically important, or as likely to become such, and thus impose upon them more 
stringent regulatory requirements.
140
 
 The U.S. financial stability regime also makes possible the extension of emergency 
funding to systemically important non-bank financial companies as well as financial market 
infrastructures. Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the Federal Reserve with the legal 
power to extend credit to critical financial market infrastructures through its discount window, 
which is normally preserved only for banks. The exercise of this option requires nevertheless 
the existence of “unusual or exigent circumstances” and the possibility is open only for those 
entities which have been designated systemically important.
141
 
 To date, the FSOC has designated as systemically important four non-bank financial 
companies
142
 and eight infrastructure providers.
143
 The majority of entities in the latter 
category are CCPs. 
 It should be noted that the FSOC’s first steps have not been without troubles, and both 
its unpredictable decision-making and non-transparent procedures have faced criticism from 
the industry and the legislature.
144
 Reportedly, the FSOC’s powers remain limited and its 
jurisdiction contested even by domestic regulators.
145
 Two bills have been presented regarding 
the authority and transparency of the FSOC. One seeks to make the Council more transparent 
and accountable, inter alia by opening its meetings to non-FSOC members. The other bill 
goes so far as to propose a one-year moratorium on systemic risk designations.
146
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4.3 Extending the scope of the EU financial stability regime 
 
It is evident that the time for complacency has not yet arrived in the EU. The Commission is 
pursuing both more integrated and better functioning Union capital markets, as well as the 
completion of its European supervisory foundations. A flagship project of the present 
Commission is to build a European capital markets union (CMU), with a specific objective of 
diversifying funding sources and reducing reliance on bank-based financing.
147
 However, 
financial stability and systemic risk are not part of the CMU project, and in its present form 
the CMU entails no initiatives on further Europeanization of financial supervision and crisis 
management, but rather presents a classic single market reform programme of the 
Commission, aimed at market building through facilitating competition and free movement.
148
 
 Notwithstanding, the institutional limits of the EU’s financial supervision and 
resolution framework are well recognized by top policymakers. The need to update and 
strengthen the Union’s macroprudential toolkit was underlined in the recent report 
“Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union”.149 The Report acknowledges that 
deeper integration of EU capital markets will gradually increase demand for a supervisory 
framework that is designed to “ensure the solidity of all financial actors” and that this should 
ultimately lead to the creation of a “single European capital markets supervisor.”150 
 The path towards a single European capital markets supervisor is no doubt rocky both 
politically and legally. After UK v. ECB (location policy) the path seems rockier and longer 
still. But turning back to the issue of CCPs, what is particularly interesting in UK v. ECB 
(Location policy) is that the General Court, after answering the question of the existence of 
the ECB’s powers in the negative, pointed out what could be called an exit strategy. Whilst 
the ECB/ESCB Statute is a protocol annexed to the Treaties and therefore, as a rule, any 
change in it would require a treaty reform in accordance with Article 48 TEU,
151
 the Court 
pointed to Article 129(3) TFEU, which provides an exception to this rule.
152
 That provision 
enables the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, to amend certain provisions of the ECB/ESCB Statute, including Article 
22 (which gives the ECB regulatory powers, e.g. in order to ensure efficient and sound 
clearing and payment systems within the Union and with other countries). This would allow a 
significant extension of the ECB’s rulemaking and oversight authority via qualified majority 
of votes, in other words, without the assent of the UK. To initiate the procedure, either a 
recommendation from the ECB or a proposal from the Commission would be needed. In light 
of the above, the General Court notes that 
 
“it would be for the ECB, should it consider that the grant to it of a power to regulate 
infrastructures clearing transactions in securities is necessary for proper performance 
  
147Commission, “Building a Capital Markets Union”, Green paper, COM(2015)63 final. 
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of the task [of promoting the smooth operation of payment systems under Art. 127(2) 
TFEU], to request the EU legislature to amend Article 22 of the Statute, by the 
addition of an explicit reference to securities clearing systems.” (para 109) 
 
 The Court’s interpretation is not without problems. Because the issue is in essence that 
of conferring on the ECB prudential oversight powers with regard to new financial entities, 
Article 127(6) TFEU would prima facie seem a more appropriate basis for such an action. 
That provision provides for the possibility of the Council to confer specific tasks upon the 
ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other 
financial institutions (with the exception of insurance undertakings). Article 127(6) indeed 
provides the legal basis for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), too, but its downside 
for the Eurosystem is the requirement to reach a unanimous decision by the Council.
153
 The 
language of Article 127(6) is also restrictive and possibly rules out the conferral of powers 
with respect to certain important non-bank financial entities (in addition to insurance firms) as 
well as resolution and restructuring powers.
154
 
 Another interesting question would be how exactly to locate such oversight powers 
within the ECB. The ECB argues that the need to oversee and regulate CCPs is crucial to 
properly execute its duty to oversee the functioning of payments systems (Art. 127(2) TFEU) 
because, again, “the failing of securities settlement systems could, indirectly, affect the 
smooth operation of payment systems.”155 In fact, the ECB has maintained that overseeing 
such systems is a constituent part of its primary duty to maintain price stability. However, 
prudential supervision of systemically risky financial institutions, at least when it comes to 
tasks such as stress testing, falls better within the domain of the ECB’s supervisory authority, 
i.e. the SSM. In fact, several important euro area CCPs are legally licensed as banks. For 
instance, German law defines CCP clearing as a banking business and thus Eurex Clearing 
AB, a significant CCP based in Germany, acts under a banking licence.
156
 However, in the 
Banking Union framework it is considered “less significant” and thus the day-to-day 
supervision is entrusted to national authorities and only indirectly to the SSM.
157
 Another 
important eurozone CCP, the French LCH.Clearnet S.A., is not in the SSM’s list of supervised 
entities despite also being licensed as a credit institution. Indeed, the EMIR does not regulate 
the question of whether CCPs should be licensed as credit institutions or as something else, 
though it did bring about a mandatory reauthorization process where each EU CCP, regardless 
of their authorization status, was reassessed and authorized to provide CCP services under the 
EMIR. 
 Therefore the business of CCPs, whether they operate under a banking licence or not, 
does not directly concern the ECB’s supervisory arm under the SSM. Indeed, the SSM is built 
on the principle of separation of monetary responsibilities from supervisory responsibilities. 
This functional separation has been executed operationally respecting the constitutional 
position of the Governing Council as the ultimate decision-making body.
158
 Article 25(2) of 
the SSM Regulation clearly states that the ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred on it by 
that Regulation without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy 
and any other tasks. Operational separation also means that the respective staff carrying out 
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the SSM-related tasks must be organizationally separated from, and subject to separate 
reporting lines, from the staff involved in carrying out the ECB’s other tasks.159 
Such operational separation seems to result in an interesting outcome: the oversight of 
financial market infrastructures such as CCPs would be a task conducted by the ECB under its 
monetary policy and payment systems-related mandates, whereas the prudential supervision 
of banks would remain a task solely reserved for the SSM. Furthermore, these supervisory 
tasks would have to be separated from each other, both functionally and operationally. This 
would not seem like an optimal arrangement. Comparison can again be made to the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council in the U.S., which has a broad and functionally defined systemic 
risk mandate and which involves every important regulator sitting at the same table. If such 
consolidation of powers, both vertically and horizontally, is to be pursued in the European 
Union, the question will arise whether the ECB is the best location for such powers. In any 
case, a more thorough and functional exercise would then be more likely, given that such a 
project, especially if the target is not limited to CCPs, would in all likelihood not fit within the 
present Treaties. 
 
 
5. Tensions in the Economic Constitution of the EU: Stability vs. free movement 
 
The Maastricht principles expressly provided that Member States will continue to bear the 
primary responsibility for the prudential supervision of financial institutions as well as the 
stability of the financial system (principles that were left untouched by subsequent Treaty 
amendments
160
). The crisis era reforms in the area economic and fiscal policy convergence as 
well as the creation of EU competences with respect to prudential supervision of financial 
institutions are gradually invalidating these principles, but the EU’s financial stability regime 
remains a young phenomenon and it is built on a constitutional foundation that is far from 
solid, especially if compared to the Union’s microeconomic constitution. 
Macroeconomic and microeconomic constitutions are fundamentally different both in 
terms of scope and nature. First, the macroeconomic constitution created by the Maastricht 
Treaty is a constitution not shared by all Member States of the European Union. This 
bifurcated constitutional reality of the Union has become increasingly salient during the 
financial and eurozone crises.
161
 In terms of the nature of the constitutions, the following 
distinction is analytically helpful: whilst the microeconomic layer of the European Economic 
Constitution has aimed at overcoming legal diversity and is supported by a well-developed 
and extensive body of free movement and competition law, moulded respectively in the 
practice of the ECJ and the Commission’s competition enforcement practice, the 
macroeconomic stability constitution is more vulnerable and less susceptible to juridification 
basically because it is more about overcoming policy diversity.
162
 
Moreover, the concept of financial stability, which is central to the macroeconomic 
constitution, is economically more problematic and politically more contestable than the 
economic paradigm behind the microeconomic constitution.
163
 From the perspective of a 
central bank, price stability as a policy goal is simpler than financial stability.
164
 The financial 
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and economic crises are nevertheless gradually changing central banking, also in Europe. 
Financial stability as a policy objective, despite its inherent ambiguity, is reaching the 
importance of the more traditional target of price stability. Schoenmaker observes that 
“central banks are returning to their roots by re-assuming a broad mandate” with respect to 
financial stability.
165
 Goodhart also remarks that though financial stability is often not a part 
of the original mandate of modern central banks, this has not stopped them diversifying their 
tasks as “clauses relating to such matters as maintaining a well-running payment systems 
were stretched in concept to cover financial stability overall as well.”166 As the recent case 
law has made clear, these tendencies have been very much present in Europe as well. In OMT, 
the ECB’s price stability mandate was stretched, with certain caveats and conditions, to cover 
possibly extensive open market operations (which were even conditional on the agreed bail-
out terms of the Troika, amongst other things). According to one interpretation financial 
stability has already replaced price stability as the overriding policy objective.
167
 
 What does this mean for the Union’s microeconomic constitution? The 
microeconomic constitution is built on fundamental economic freedoms which, through the 
doctrine of direct effect, have been transformed into enforceable private rights; the 
macroeconomic constitution, on the other hand, is defined more in terms of broad objectives 
and policies.
168
 The effective execution of macroeconomic policies, a pursuit considered by 
some “more art than science”,169 also requires discretionary powers and more diverse toolkits. 
Insofar as the financial stability-oriented regulatory or policy measures do not violate the 
concrete individual rights that form the core of the microeconomic constitution, the two 
constitutions, despite their differences, can most likely coexist peacefully. But when they 
conflict, choices between statutory objectives must be made and this can prove difficult 
especially in the bifurcated constitutional reality of the two-speed European Union. It is 
commonly suggested that financial stability concerns should prevail over, for instance, 
soundness of individual financial institutions or “microprudentialism” more generally.170 But 
when the conflict is that between financial stability motivated restrictions on the provision of 
services and the fundamental principles as established by the EU’s free movement law, 
striking the balance will become a nightmarish exercise. Inter-institutional conflicts might not 
be avoided either. 
UK v. ECB (Location policy) is an apt demonstration of a situation where the exercise 
of new EU level competences and forms of direct administration related to the objective of 
financial stability can result in an outright conflict with basic free movement rights. What the 
ECB policy tried to achieve was nothing less than a systematic market foreclosure of euro 
area markets for certain financial entities operating into the eurozone from the non-euro 
Member States. Perhaps most strikingly, UK v. ECB (Location policy) coincided with difficult 
and ongoing transatlantic talks on mutual recognition of CCPs between the U.S. and EU. One 
of the most difficult topics in the talks has been the mutual recognition of regulatory 
frameworks for CCPs, which would enable the use of each region’s CCPs by their respective 
market participants without costly additional capital penalties.
171
 Stakes are getting higher as 
suggestions have already been made about possible restrictions on access to U.S. market for 
EU CCPs, in case agreement is not reached.
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 Interestingly, these talks have been led by the 
ESMA and the Commission with no apparent involvement from the ECB. Against such 
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international negotiations, it seems peculiar that at the same time the ECB was defending in 
court its policy aimed at restricting altogether market access to the euro area of certain 
systemic CCPs from inside the EU (even if the restriction would have been triggered only 
after reaching certain quantitative thresholds). 
The attempted restrictions also coincide with the ongoing endeavour by the EU 
legislature to create a pan-EU level-playing field for post-trade financial market 
infrastructures. In fact, the EMIR is designed to prevent direct and indirect forms of 
discrimination against CCPs located in any Member State or against a Member State or a 
group of Member States as a venue for CCPs.
173
 This general principle is further enforced by 
the MiFID II (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, as revised
174
) which, for instance, 
requires that Member States ensure that investment firms from other Member States have the 
right to access CCPs in their territory and that such access is subject to the same non-
discriminatory, transparent and objective criteria.
175
 
These tensions are symptomatic of a deepening division between the “ins” and the 
“outs” of the Eurosystem, which is a “transitional period of unknown duration”.176 Similar 
concerns have been expressed in the context of the Banking Union as well. As noted by 
Andrea Enria, in case of important disagreements between the ECB as a single supervisor and 
the authorities of non-participating countries, “there is a potential risk that a greater degree of 
flexibility will be maintained at the EU level, while the SSM will move to more homogeneous 
rules and supervisory practices.”177 In the longer run there is a clear risk that such a two-speed 
Union generates “a rift within the Single Market.”178 
To conclude, the financial and eurozone debt crises have caught the EU’s single 
financial market between the Scylla of disintegration and gradual return to protectionism, a 
likely outcome of a failure to erect adequate supervisory and crisis management systems,
179
 
and the Charybdis of the “uneasy coexistence”180 with the Banking Union and the organically 
expanding financial stability mandate of the ECB. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
This article analysed the implications of and the several legal problems involved in UK v. 
ECB (Location policy), where the General Court determined that the ECB does not have 
competence to regulate CCPs or securities settlement systems and thus annulled a Policy 
Framework of the ECB insofar as it imposed on CCPs involved in the clearing of securities a 
requirement to be located within the euro area.
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 Three broad problems of the case were 
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assessed: first, it was shown that CCPs are systemically important financial market 
infrastructures which play a dominant risk management role especially in the market for OTC 
derivatives. Such position of CCPs would warrant more European oversight, but this would 
not solve the ECB’s problem that most important CCPs in Europe are established in London 
outside the regulatory and supervisory grip of the Eurosystem. Second, the article argued that 
depriving the ECB of powers with respect to such critical financial market infrastructures is 
symptomatic more generally of certain structural design issues in the Union’s evolving 
financial stability regime. The regime is too focused on banks and therefore we should 
welcome the initiatives on developing the regime towards a more functional and 
comprehensive framework for the management of systemic risks stemming from the entire 
financial system. Finally, the article pinpointed certain risks involved in the gradual expansion 
of the ECB’s mandate and toolkit as the guardian of the financial stability of the euro area. As 
UK v. ECB (Location policy) made clear, the financial stability mandate or macroeconomic 
constitutionalization more generally will be able to coexist with the Union’s foundational 
microeconomic constitution only insofar as the new powers are not exercised in a manner that 
violates the core rights guaranteed by established free movement law. The article nevertheless 
anticipates that such conflicts might be inevitable. The occasionally conflicting rationalities of 
stability on one hand and competition and free movement on the other, present perhaps the 
biggest danger in terms of further deepening the jurisdictional wedge between the “ins” and 
the “outs” of the eurozone. 
